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The Constitutional Administration of the





The Beirut Agreement' is a multilateral treaty designed to promote
the exchange of audiovisual materials between foreign nations.2 The
Agreement grants an export certificate to materials deemed by the ex-
porting country to be "educational, cultural or scientific," entitling them
to duty-free status and other favorable treatment in the importing coun-
try.3 An importing country has the power to override an export certifi-
cate and to place a duty on the materials, 4 but no country receiving
materials from the United States has ever exercised this circumvention.-
Before the United States will grant an export certificate, a film must
meet the certification criteria set forth in regulations established by the
United States Information Agency (USIA).6 Although denial of a certifi-
cate does not preclude distribution abroad,7 high exporting costs could
act as an economic barrier for overseas distribution of uncertified films.8
* A.B., Political Science, University of California, Davis (1986); Member, Third Year
Class, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. Beirut Agreement, opened for signature July 15, 1949, 17 U.S.T. 1578, T.I.A.S. No.
6116, 197 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Beirut Agreement].
2. The United States is one of 29 signatory nations, and an additional 28 nations partici-
pate in the Agreement. The United States also recognizes the exporting certificates of an addi-
tional 15 countries. 22 C.F.R. § 502.7(e) (1988).
3. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1, at art. I, 17 U.S.T. at 1580-81, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197
U.N.T.S. at 4. A certified film becomes exempt from importing requirements such as "import
duties, import licenses, special taxes, quantitative restrictions, and other restraints and costs."
22 C.F.R. § 502.1(b) (1988).
4. Beirut Agreeement, art. IV, part 4, 17 U.S.T. at 1583-84, T.I.A.S. No. 6116, 197
U.N.T.S. at 8.
5. See Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492, 500 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
6. 22 C.F.R. §§ 502.1-502.8 (1988).
7. 22 C.F.R. § 502.30) (1988).
8. Duties assessed can be as much as $50,000 per film. See Rosenberg, For Our Eyes
Only, AM. FILM, July-Aug. 1983, at 40-42.
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The constitutionality of the United States' certification process was
challenged in the case of Bullfrog Films v. Wick.9 Filmmakers, whose
films were classified as "propaganda"'" and denied certification, alleged
that the USIA's certification guidelines were impermissibly vague and
gave the Agency unconstitutional discretion to deny certificates to films
with viewpoints different than its own." The district court held that the
guidelines were unconstitutional, and that the Agency's obligation under
the Beirut Agreement "may not, consistent with the Constitution, place
the USIA in the position of a censor."12
The purpose of this Note is to determine whether constitutionally
acceptable certification criteria can be formulated to fulfill the mandates
of the Beirut Agreement. Part I will examine the purpose of the Beirut
Agreement and the USIA's certification criteria. Part II will analyze the
application of the criteria to the films in the Bullfrog case and the reason-
ing behind the court's decision. Part III will examine the Agency's con-
tinued efforts to draft acceptable certification regulations, as well as the
United States' obligations to the other Treaty members under the Vienna
Convention. The Note will conclude with proposals for certification cri-
teria that could satisfy both the Constitution and the goals of the Beirut
Agreement.
I
Foundation for Analysis of the Treaty
A. Delegation of Authority to the USIA to Carry Out the Provisions of the
Beirut Agreement
The Beirut Agreement is the product of several years of negotiations
among the members of the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO).' 3 Although the United States Senate
approved the Agreement on May 26, 1960, it withheld actual ratification
until enactment of the legislation needed to implement the Treaty. 1
4
Congress passed the implementing legislation on October 8, 1966,'5 and
9. 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal 1986).
10. Under 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3)(iv), the Agency has the discretionary authority to label
material that in its opinion constitutes propaganda. The Agency defines propaganda as mate-
rial that is "substantially adapted to prevail upon, indoctrinate, convert, induce or in any other
way influence a viewer or user with reference to any specific political, religious or economic
views, practices, movements, causes or systems or belief." Id.
11. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 25, Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(No. CV 85-7930).
12. 646 F. Supp. at 510.
13. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1.
14. S. REP. No. 1626, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 3143, 3144.
15. Pub. L. No. 89-634, 80 Stat. 879 (1966).
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authorized the President to designate a federal agency which would be
responsible for carrying out the provisions of the Treaty.16 Pursuant to
this mandate, the President delegated authority to the United States In-
formation Agency.17 Formal operations under the Treaty officially com-
menced on January 12, 1967.18
According to its Preamble, the primary objective of the Beirut
Agreement is to facilitate "the free flow of ideas by word and image" in
order to promote "the mutual understanding of peoples."'9 The first ar-
ticle of the Agreement sets forth the criteria materials must meet to re-
ceive favorable treatment from the importing country:
Visual and auditory materials shall be deemed to be of an educational,
scientific and cultural character:
(a) When their primary purpose or effect is to instruct or inform
through the development of a subject or aspect of a subject, or when
their content is such as to maintain, increase or diffuse knowledge, and
augment international understanding and goodwill; and
(b) When the materials are representative, authentic, and accurate;
and
(c) When the technical quality is such that it does not interfere with
the use made of the material[s].2°
Construing these mandates, the USIA enacted substantive and proce-
dural certification criteria to make the provisions operable.
B. The USIA's Certification Criteria
The pertinent provisions of the USIA's procedural guidelines re-
quire the applicant to complete the Agency's application form and to
submit a description of the content of the materials, as well as copies or
examples of the materials.21 The certification requests are then re-
viewed,22 and once a certificate is granted, it serves as a recommendation
to the importing country that the materials meet the requirements set
forth in the Agreement.23
16. Id.
17. Exec. Order No. 11,311, 3 C.F.R. 593 (1966-1970), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4673.
18. 22 C.F.R. § 502.1 (1988).
19. Beirut Agreement, supra note 1.
20. Id. Some commentators have stated that the duty requirements are aimed at commer-
cial films that generate profits for the filmmakers, rather than at documentary films which
usually do not generate enough of a profit. Not-So-Sly Censorship, L.A. Times, Aug. 3, 1988,
at B6, col. 1.
21. 22 C.F.R. § 502.3(g) (1988).
22. Id. at § 502.3(h). The Chief Attestation Officer of the USIA and his/her staff make
the initial rulings. Id. at § 502.4(a).
23. Beirut Agreement, supra note I (emphasis added).
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The regulations also provide for a process of review for films that
have been denied certificates.2 4 An applicant may ask for a formal re-
view by the Review Board,25 which will reexamine materials that are
denied certificates.26 If the review results in a denial, the applicant may
make a written appeal to the director of the USIA.
27
The substantive criteria define what material is to be considered "ed-
ucational, cultural or scientific."' 28 The first section of the regulations
incorporates Article I of the Beirut Agreement; 29 the subsequent sections
further define what constitutes "educational, cultural or scientific" mate-
rial under the Treaty. Section 502.6(b)(3) states:
The Agency does not certify or authenticate materials which by special
pleading attempt generally to influence opinion, conviction or policy
(religious, economic, or political propaganda), to espouse a cause, or
conversely, when they seem to attack a particular persuasion.
30
Section 502.6(b)(5) provides:
The Agency does not regard as augmenting international understand-
ing or goodwill and cannot certify or authenticate any material which
may lend itself to misinterpretation, or misrepresentation of the United
States or other countries, their peoples or institutions or which appear
to have as their purpose or effect to attack or discredit economic, reli-
gious, or political views or practices.
31
II
Bullfrog Films v. Wick
A. Films at Issue in the Action
The USIA denied export certificates to filmmakers and distributors
in Bullfrog Films v. Wick for the following films:32 In Our Own Back-
yards. Uranium Mining in the United States (describing the effects of
mining on the environment, mine workers, and local populations); Peace:
A Conscious Choice and Save the Planet (both anti-nuclear films);
Whatever Happened to Childhood? (depicting drug-use among youth);
Ecocide: A Strategy of War and The Secret Agent (detailing the environ-
mental aspects of Agent Orange and the United States' role in the Viet-




28. Id. at §§ 502.6(a)(3), (b)(3), (b)(5).
29. See text accompanying notes 19-20, supra.
30. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3) (1988).
31. Id. at § 502.6(b)(5).
32. 646 F. Supp. 492, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1986). The maker of a seventh film, The Secret
Agent, was originally denied a certificate, but the Review Board reversed this decision on ap-
peal. Nevertheless, the filmmaker had standing to sue in the Bullfrog case in order to seek
declaratory relief by challenging the USIA's regulations. Id. at 496 n.5, 498 n. 11.
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nam War); and From the Ashes . . . Nicaragua Today (a historical
account of United States/Nicaraguan relations).33 Several of the docu-
mentaries had been awarded Red Ribbons at the American Film Festi-
val,34 and most had received critical acclaim.35
The Agency denied certificates to the various films because they "es-
pouse[d] a cause" and were allegedly "inaccurate, .... imbalanced," or ca-
pable of "being misinterpreted or misunderstood by foreign audiences
lacking adequate American points of reference." 6 Specifically, the
Agency found that In Our Own Backyards did not meet the "neutral
viewpoint" requirement of section 502.6(b)(3) because it presented an
anti-nuclear message and attempted to "persuade the audience that all
uranium mining should be prevented.""' The Agency determined that
Whatever Happened to Childhood? failed to portray youths who are "typ-
ical or representative of all American youth today,"'3 and therefore was
"not representative" under section 502.6(a)(3). 39 Ecocide was denied a
certificate because the film "attack[ed] the United States" and failed to
promote international understanding.' From the Ashes was found to
lead viewers to conclude "that the United States Government is the pri-
mary cause of instability, poverty, and oppression in Nicaragua," thereby
constituting both an "attempt to persuade" contrary to section
502.6(b)(3), and "an attack on the institutions of the United States [in
violation of] section 502.6(b)(5)."4 Based on these findings, the Agency
refused to label the films as "educational" and denied them export
certificates.42
B. Plaintiffs' Claims
The plaintiffs alleged that the Agency engaged in selective censor-
ship by only issuing certificates to films " 'whose point[s] of view' the
33. Id. at 496.
34. Id.
35. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 10, 13, 14-15, 20-21, 23, Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp.
492 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (No. CV 85-7930).
36. 646 F. Supp. at 496.
37. In Our Own Backyards: Uranium Mining in the United States, USIA certification
decision, Feb. 22, 1985, at 3 (available from the USIA).
38. Whatever Happened to Childhood?, USIA certification decision, Aug. 28, 1985, at 3
(available from the USIA).
39. Id.
40. Ecocide: A Strategy of War, USIA certification decision, July 13, 1984, at 3, 4 (avail-
able from the USIA).
41. From the Ashes... Nicaragua Today, USIA certification decision, Aug. 28, 1985, at 3,
4 (available from the USIA).
42. 646 F. Supp. at 497.
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[A]gency finds consistent with its own views."43 Arguing that the
Agency was using the Beirut Agreement "as a content-based censorship
mechanism" to "promote a particular ideological point of view,"'  the
plaintiffs cited as support the certification of less controversial films such
as To Catch a Cloud: A Thoughtful Look at Acid Rain, Radiation...
Naturally and The Family: God's Pattern for Living.4 5
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief46 based on the the-
ory that sections 502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5) were facially invalid under the
first and fifth amendments to the Constitution." Plaintiffs also alleged
that the two regulations, along with Article I of the Agreement, as codi-
fied at section 502.6(a)(3), were invalid as applied and in violation of the
mandates of the Beirut Treaty.48
C. District Court Findings
The District Court of the Central District of California first ex-
amined the substantive regulations to determine if they were consistent
with the Treaty's provisions. If the regulations were found to be incon-
sistent with the underlying statutory basis, then the issue of their consti-
tutionality would not need to be addressed; "[if] it is possible to decide
this case on non-constitutional grounds, the court must do so."49 The
court, however, found that the regulations "seem to be consistent with
the guidelines set out by [UNESCO] .... Thus, there is no basis on
which to hold that the regulations are inconsistent with the Treaty."5
1. Standard of Review
In determining the standard of review, the district court raised the
issue of the scope of first amendment protection with regard to communi-
cations with foreign audiences."1 The court held that "there can be no
question that, in the absence of some overriding governmental interest,
... the First Amendment protects communications with foreign audi-
43. Plaintiffs' Complaint at 25, Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986)
(No. CV 85-7930).
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. at 25-26. The Family was certified under § 502.6(b)(3) for use by moral or reli-
gious organizations. 646 F. Supp. at 497 n.7.
46. 646 F. Supp. at 497.
47. Id. The Court, sua sponte, also found § 502.6(a)(3), which sets forth the language
from Article I of the Treaty, to be unconstitutional on its face. See notes 77-84 and accompa-
nying text.
48. Id. at 497.
49. Id. at 500.
50. Id. at 501.
51. Id. at 502. The Court raised this issue sua sponte at oral argument. Id.
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ences to the same extent as communications within our borders."52 The
unprotected areas of speech include obscenity,53 fighting words,54 and
words that could threaten national security. 55 Because the defendants in
Bullfrog did not claim that the filmmakers' speech fell into these unpro-
tected categories, the district court concluded that the regulations were
subject to "the same constitutional analysis as would be applied to any
legislation claimed to infringe on First Amendment freedoms at
home."5 6 The Bullfrog court therefore applied the strict scrutiny stan-
dard to the certification criteria.
2. Certification as a Government Benefit, Not a Government Subsidy
The district court then considered whether the regulations abridged
the filmmakers' rights under the first amendment. The USIA argued
that since the denial of a United States certificate did not preclude ex-
portation of uncertified films to foreign nations, plaintiffs had been de-
nied only a government subsidy. The Agency asserted that "First
Amendment rights are not infringed merely because the government re-
fuses to subsidize those rights."57 The district court found, however, that
certification is not a government subsidy, but rather a government bene-
fit, and "an indispensible [sic] prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of the
Treaty."5 According to the court, "once the government makes benefits
available, it may not withhold them on the basis of 'unconstitutional
conditions'. '"51
The withholding of a government benefit was addressed in Perry v.
Sinderman, 0 where a state college professor's employment contract was
terminated without a hearing. Although the college had not adopted a
formal tenure system, the professor alleged that the college had a de facto
tenure policy and that he was entitled to prove the legitimacy of his claim
for a tenured position.6' The Supreme Court found that a de facto tenure
policy could constitute a claim for a property interest in continued em-
52. Id.
53. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
54. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
55. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
56. 646 F. Supp. at 502.
57. Id. at 501. See' e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (tax
exemption statute for non-profit organizations held valid, even though it required the organiza-
tion to not engage in lobbying in order to benefit from the exemption); Cammarano v. United
States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (tax placed upon advertising expenditures of private individuals
held not to violate first amendment right to freedom of speech).
58. Id. at 501-502. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
59. Id. at 502.
60. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
61. Id.
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ployment, 62 and that the denial of the benefit without hearing violated
the professor's right to due process. The Court stated that because such
benefits had been given, they could not be denied "on a basis that in-
fringes ...constitutionally protected interests . *.".., Similarly, the
Bullfrog court held that the government benefit of certification cannot be
withheld on a basis that abridges the filmmakers' first amendment rights
to freedom of speech. 64
3. Vagueness Challenge to Sections 502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5)
A statute is considered void on its face if it is "[s]o vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application ....65 Vagueness violates the due process clause of
the fifth amendment because it not only fails to give sufficient notice of
what to avoid, but also allows those implementing the law boundless dis-
cretion.66 The district court in Bullfrog applied this standard to sections
502.6(b)(3) and (b)(5) and found them both impermissibly vague.67
Several of the phrases used in section 502.6(b)(3), 68 such as "special
pleading, .... seem to attack" and "particular persuasion," were found to
provide a "classic example of a [constitutionally impermissible] . . . 'invi-
tation to subjective or discriminatory enforcement'., 69 The court also
found the provision that "films may not attempt generally to influence
opinion" 70 did not define an objective standard for measuring the effect
of a film on its viewers. 71 The court held that this breadth "leav[es] the
decision to the subjective standards of the USIA [, which] is precisely the
evil that the vagueness doctrine seeks to avoid."
72
Section 502.6(b)(5) was rejected as "vague," and "inherently incapa-
ble of objective application. ' 73 This section stated that the Agency can-
not certify "any material which may lend itself to misinterpretation or
misrepresentation of the United States."' 74 The court found this phrase
"hopelessly unclear, '75 since "how is one to determine what is 'misrepre-
62. Id. at 599-602. See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
63. 408 U.S. at 597.
64. 646 F. Supp. at 502.
65. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1925).
66. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31 at 1035 (1988).
67. 646 F. Supp. at 505.
68. See supra text accompanying note 30.
69. 646 F. Supp. at 505 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 113 (1972)).
70. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(b)(3) (1988).
71. 646 F. Supp. at 505.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra text accompanying note 31.
75. 646 F. Supp. at 505.
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sentative' of an open, diverse and pluralistic society as is the United
States?"76
4. Constitutionality of the Beirut Agreement
On its own accord, the district court addressed the constitutionality
of section 502.6(a)(3)," which sets forth the provisions of Article I of the
Beirut Agreement. The court found section 502.6(a)(3) unconstitutional
on several grounds. First, the provision that material will not be consid-
ered "educational" unless it "augment[s] international understanding
and goodwill" was unconstitutionally vague because it did not "give the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited so that he may act accordingly.""8 Further, the requirement
that a film be "accurate" in order to be certified7 9 was unconstitutional as
applied because it "cannot help but be based on the content of the [film]
and the message it delivers."8 0
In finding section 502.6(a)(3) unconstitutional, the court held that it
could strike down the provision without invalidating the Beirut Agree-
ment itself: " '[When] a treaty is not self-executing, it is not the treaty
but the implementing legislation that is effectively' [the] law of the
land.''  As support, the Bullfrog court cited the case of Hopson v.
Kreps,s2 where native Alaskan whalers challenged the authority of the
Department of Commerce to implement the regulations made pursuant
to the International Whaling Convention. 3 The Ninth Circuit stated
that "[a] treaty has no independent significance in resolving [the intended
meaning of the terms of the statute]" in a legal action concerning the
validity of the implementing regulations, and is relevant only to the ex-
76. Id.
77. The plaintiffs' cause of action alleged only that § 502.6(a)(3) was unconstitutional as
applied to the films in the case. The court, sua sponte, found the section to not only be uncon-
stitutional as applied, but also to be unconstitutionally vague on its face: "In the circum-
stances here, the as applied challenge cannot be distinguished from a facial challenge. Thus
... both species of challenge-facial and as applied-are questions of law which may be freely
addressed." 646 F. Supp. at 507 n.19 (quoting Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for
Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 796-98 (1984)).
78. 646 F. Supp. at 507 (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
79. 22 C.F.R. § 502.6(a)(3) (1988).
80. 646 F. Supp. at 507 (quoting Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648 (1984)). See infra
notes 85-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unconstitutional application of the
regulations.
81. 646 F. Supp. at 508 (quoting L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITU-
TION 157 (1972)).
82. 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980).
83. The Ninth Circuit stated that the main issue to be decided was whether the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission exceeded its jurisdiction under the Treaty when it changed the
regulations used to implement the International Whaling Convention. Id. at 1377.
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tent that it will aid in the construction of the regulations.8 4 Thus, even
though Article I of the Beirut Agreement was incorporated into uncon-
stitutional regulations, its independent validity is not affected.
.5. Unconstitutional Application of the Regulations
Regulations of speech that discriminate based on content are gener-
ally intolerable under the first amendment.8 5 However, because the Bei-
rut Agreement stipulates that only materials deemed to be cultural,
educational or scientific are eligible to receive the Treaty's benefits, exam-
ination of the films' contents is a prerequisite to the granting of an export
certificate. The district court acknowledged that the Agency must exer-
cise some subjective evaluation in the certification process, but held that
"any limited inquiry into the content of the speech.., must be neutral as
to viewpoint; discrimination on the basis of political or other beliefs is
not tolerated."
86
Courts recognize that various situations require a reviewing body to
evaluate speech based upon its content. In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United
States,87 the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to orga-
nizations with "educational" viewpoints, if the organization presented a
"full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts [so] as to permit an individ-
ual.., to form an independent opinion or conclusion."88 Although the
District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged the IRS's obligation to ad-
minister content-based regulations in order to grant tax-exempt status to
these "educational" organizations,89 it held this definition of "educa-
tional" to be unconstitutionally vague.9'
In the Bullfrog case, the district court found that the language in the
certification criteria defining "educational" was not viewpoint-neutral
and discriminated on the basis of political content.9 ' The court held that
section 502.6(b)(5), which allows the rejection of materials that "misrep-
resent the United States,"92 impermissibly "places the government in the
84. Id. at 1380.
85. 646 F. Supp. at 505. See, e.g., Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984) (statute
making it a crime to photograph any security of the United States except for educational
purposes held to violate the first amendment because it discriminated on the basis of content);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (government has no power to restrict expression based
on subject matter of content); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92 (1972)
(ordinance distinguishing between labor picketing and other peaceful picketing held to violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment).
86. 646 F. Supp. at 506.
87. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
88. Id. at 1033-34.
89. See id. at 1033-35.
90. Id. at 1034-35, 1037. See infra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
91. 646 F. Supp. at 506.
92. See supra text accompanying note 31.
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position of determining what is the 'truth' about America, politically and
otherwise." 93 In addition, section 502.6(b)(3) "prohibits the certification
of materials that state a point of view," 94 a right that "has always rested
on the highest rung on the hierarchy of First Amendment values."95 Be-
cause these provisions allow excessive government regulation based upon
content, the Bullfrog court held them to be unconstitutional.96
III
Impact of Bullfrog on Participants in the
Beirut Agreement
A. The Agency's Revised Regulations
Upon declaring the USIA's certification criteria unconstitutional,
the district court instructed the Agency to draft a new set of substantive
regulations that would be both constitutional and allow the Agency to
fulfill the mandates of the Beirut Agreement. 97 In compliance with this
order, the Agency issued three new interim regulations pending an ap-
peal of the Bullfrog case to the Ninth Circuit.98
The new regulations contained almost the exact wording of the prior
section 502.6(a)(3); the only significant change was a deletion of the sub-
provision mandating that materials be "representative, authentic and ac-
curate."99  The three new provisions deem a film to be educational,
cultural or scientific if it satisfies the following elements:
(i) The content of the audiovisual material is presented in a primarily
factual or demonstrative manner.
(ii) To the extent that the material reflects a viewpoint or viewpoints
which purport to be supported by factual bases, the facts are not dis-
torted. The facts will be deemed distorted if they do not represent the
current state of factual knowledge of a subject or aspect of a subject,
vrifiable [sic] by generally accepted methods, or if the facts are
presented in such a way as to constitute hate material (such as the
racial supremacist material involved in National Alliance v. United
States, 710 F.2d 868 (1983)).
(iii) To the extent that the material presents, promotes, or advocates a
conclusion or viewpoint for which different viewpoint(s), theory(ies) or
interpretation(s) may exist, the material acknowledges, presents or re-
fers to the existence of a difference of opinion or other point of view.l1°
93. 646 F. Supp. at 506.
94. See supra text accompanying note 30.
95. 646 F. Supp. at 506 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
96. Id. at 506.
97. Id. at 510-11.
98. 52 Fed. Reg. 43753 (1987) (to be codified at 22 C.F.R. at 502) (proposed Nov. 6,
1987).
99. Id. at 43757.
100. Id.
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Under these revised regulations, the Agency re-evaluated the films
in the Bullfrog case and granted a certificate to the film Whatever Hap-
pened to Childhood?.'0o It also granted a certificate to From the Ashes...
Nicaragua Today, but required the film to carry a propaganda warning
label.'° 2 The four remaining films were denied certificates. 103
In the spring of 1988, six months after the Agency redrafted the
certification criteria, the district court struck down the interim regula-
tions as unconstitutional on their face." °4 The court expressed concern
that the revised regulations allowed the Agency to label a film as "propa-
ganda" if the film simply presented a point of view. Such a procedure
was not required by the Beirut Agreement and, in the court's view, had
the sole purpose of discouraging foreign countries from granting benefits
to films so labelled.' Objecting that the Agency may, in effect, condi-
tion certification of films on the carrying of a propaganda label," 6 the
court ordered provisional certification for all of the Bullfrog films so that
they could receive the benefits afforded by the Beirut Agreement. 107
B. Ninth Circuit's Ruling and Subsequent Court Activity
Several days after the district court rejected the revised certification
criteria, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the initial Bullfrog decision, stating
that the original regulations "are so ambiguous that they provide USIA
officials with a virtual license to engage in censorship."' 08
The Agency has appealed the ruling on the interim set of regulations
to the Ninth Circuit.0 9 Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit granted a request
to stay the order for a second rewrite pending the appeal of the interim
regulations." ° The fate of the interim regulations may determine the
101. Whatever Happened to Childhood?, USIA certification decision, certificate no. 40,324,
Jan. 15, 1988.
102. From the Ashes . . . Nicaragua Today, USIA certification decision, certificate no.
40,323, Jan. 15, 1988.
103. 9 ENT. L. RPTR. 8 (Feb. 1988).
104. Memorandum Decision and Order declaring interim regulations unconstitutional,
Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. May 13, 1989) (No. CV 85-7930).
105. Id. at 5-6.
106. The importing country could still veto this certified status if importing officials felt
that the film did not meet the mandates of the Treaty. However, no country has ever exercised
this power over materials leaving the United States. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
107. Memorandum Decision and Order declaring interim regulations unconstitutional,
Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 646 F. Supp. 492 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (No. CV 85-7930 at 6-7).
108. Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 847 F.2d 502, 514 (9th Cir. 1988).
109. Oral arguments were heard before the Ninth Circuit on January 17, 1989. L.A. Daily
Journal, Jan. 18, 1989, at 24, col. 1.
110. Order granting a stay of the district court's order' to rewrite the interim regulations,
pending the appeal of the interim regulations to the Ninth Circuit, Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 847
F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 88-6310).
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future for domestic documentary filmmakers and their ability to dis-
tribute films abroad.
C. The United States' Obligations Under International Law and the Vienna
Convention
As a signatory member of the Beirut Agreement, the United States
has a duty under international law to uphold its obligations to the
Treaty. The Vienna Convention11 governs the obligations of member
nations to a treaty, and sets forth the actions a nation may take if one
member "materially breaches" a treaty.
1 12
A material breach is defined as "[t]he violation of a provision essen-
tial to the accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."'
13
After the original certification criteria were struck down, operations
under the Beirut Agreement were suspended, resulting in a backlog of
films awaiting Agency review. 14 Because the virtual standstill in the cer-
tification process could constitute a material breach of the Agreement,"I5
the Ninth Circuit is allowing the Agency to use the interim regulations to
certify films until the Ninth Circuit reviews the regulations.",
6
By invoking the "impossibility of performance" clause of the Vienna
Convention, the United States could voluntarily withdraw from the
Agreement. The clause provides:
A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility re-
sults from the permanent disappearance or destruction of an object
indispensable for the execution of the treaty .. . . Impossibility of
performance may not be invoked by a party as a ground for terminat-
ing, withdrawing from or suspending the operation of a treaty if the
impossibility is the result of a breach by that party ... of an obligation
under the treaty. 1
7
Indeed, following the decision by the district court to strike down
the interim regulations, Agency sentiment was that constitutional regula-
tions could not be formulated, and that compliance with the Vienna Con-
11. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
112. Id. at 346.
113. Id.
114. A USIA review reported a backlog of 3,500 audio-visual materials awaiting review as
of early 1988. L.A. Daily Journal, May 18, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
115. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at 346.
116. Order granting a stay of the district court's order to rewrite the interim regulations,
pending the appeal of the interim regulations to the Ninth Circuit, Bullfrog Films v. Wick, 847
F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1988) (No. 88-6310 at 3). However, certificates are still being denied under
the interim regulations. The film The Last Empire. Intervention in Nuclear War was denied a
certificate in the Fall of 1989. Telephone interview with David Cole, attorney for plaintiffs,
(Oct. 4, 1989).
117. Vienna Convention, supra note 111, at 346.
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vention could only be accomplished by withdrawing from the Treaty.
The former Director of the USIA, Charles Z. Wick, submitted an affida-
vit to the court recommending that if the district court's ruling was up-
held, the United States would withdraw from the Agreement on the
grounds that the court's first amendment standards precluded the United
States from fulfilling its Treaty obligations:
Further attempts to draft regulations which, as envisioned by [the]
court, would be less content-based and more 'broadly' define the cate-
gories of films which may be certified would, in my opinion, deviate
from the requirements of ... the [T]reaty to such an extent that the
[A]gency would no longer be following the language and intent of the
[T]reaty. 11
8
However, the appointment of Bruce Gelb to the post of USIA direc-
tor" 9 may signal a new Agency sentiment. Shortly after his appoint-
ment, Mr. Gelb stated that the Agency would not petition the Supreme
Court for certiorari to review the initial Bullfrog decision. 12 0 But it is not
known what actions Mr. Gelb and the Agency will take if the Ninth
Circuit affirms the district court decision striking the interim regulations
as unconstitutional. The options available include further revision of the
regulations to meet constitutional standards, withdrawal from the Beirut
Agreement as provided by the Vienna Convention, or petition to the
Supreme Court for certiorari.
D. Towards a Constitutional Set of Certification Criteria
In order to fulfill the Beirut Agreement's objective of promoting one
international exchange of films, a workable definition of cultural, educa-
tional and scientific materials must be incorporated into the certification
criteria. Several modifications to the interim criteria might achieve this
goal.
First, the Agency should consider adopting the procedural test that
was used to evaluate content of speech in National Alliance v. United
States.'2 ' The Internal Revenue Service formulated this "Methodology"
test 122 to cure the vagueness of the definition of "educational" struck
down in the case of Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States.' 23 According
to the National Alliance court, the test minimizes the inquiry into the
118. L.A. Times, July 27, 1988, Part I, at 3, col. 5.
119. Mr. Gelb was confirmed by the Senate on April 13, 1989. USIA, News Release (Apr.
14, 1989), at 1.
120. L.A. Times, March 30, 1989, part 6 (calendar), at 4, col. 1.
121. 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
122. Id. at 870.
123. 631 F.2d 1030 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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content of the expression and focuses instead on the method of presenta-
tion. 124 It considers the following factors:
1. Whether or not the presentation of viewpoints unsupported by a
relevant factual basis constitutes a significant portion of the organiza-
tion's communications.
2. To the extent viewpoints purport to be supported by a factual ba-
sis, [if] the facts [are] distorted.
3. Whether or not the organization makes substantial use of particu-
larly inflammatory and disparaging terms, expressing conclusions
based more on strong emotional feelings than objective factual
evaluations.
4. Whether or not the approach to a subject matter is aimed at devel-
oping an understanding on the part of the addressees, by reflecting
consideration of the extent to which they have prior background or
training. 1
25
The Agency could incorporate similar criteria into its own regula-
tions to evaluate films under the "cultural, educational, or scientific"
standard set forth in the Treaty. Such a test would allow the evaluation
of materials in a viewpoint-neutral manner, "[even] [t]hough a particular
public officer may strongly disagree with the proposition advocated."'1
26
In addition, the Agency should strike the provision of the interim
regulation which states that "the facts will be deemed distorted if they
... are presented in such a way as to constitute hate material."' 27 Be-
cause hate material has not been recognized as an area of speech outside
of the protection of the Constitution, 28 the provision violates the first
amendment as it discriminates based on the content of speech. A film
should only be denied an export certificate if it fails to meet the cultural,
educational, or scientific standard as interpreted under viewpoint-neutral
regulations.
The Agency should, finally, discontinue the use of propaganda la-
bels. A main source of dispute over the revised regulations is the contin-
ued existence of the propaganda label.'29 The Agency contends that the
label is "informative," rather than "disparaging," because it "encourages
124. 710 F.2d at 875.
125. Id. at 874.
126. Id.
127. 52 Fed. Reg. 43753, 43757 (1987). As an example of hate material, the regulation
cites the material at issue in National Alliance v. United States, 710 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
When evaluated under the Methodology test, this material (newsletters with general themes
that non-whites are inferior to white Americans, and are brutal and dangerous people, 710
F.2d at 871) was not found to have a basis in fact so as to render the material educational. Id.
at 874.
128. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely,
408 U.S. 92 (1972); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). However, if such material
could constitute "fighting words," then it would not be constitutionally protected. See supra
note 54.
129. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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foreign governments to take a second look at a film." 3° The Agency also
claims that the filmmakers' allegations of labelling as a form of censor-
ship "are unduly patronizing to foreign governments [by] assuming that
they are going to unduly roll over to a USIA comment."''
This practice of certifying films and then labelling them with propa-
ganda warnings might cause the importing country to exercise discretion
in the certification process for the first time. As evidence of this, Cana-
dian officials have already stated that they will not grant duty-free status
to any American film bearing a propaganda label,132 even though it has
been certified by the Agency. If other countries follow suit, this could
significantly alter the role of the importing country under the Beirut
Agreement, I33 since an importing country has never actually overruled a
certification decision by the United States.' 34 Thus, because certified
films bearing a propaganda label might not receive duty-free status, this
labelling practice fails to achieve the underlying Treaty objective of pro-
moting the international exchange of materials.
In addition, the presence of a label could have a chilling effect on
American production of documentary films because of the negative con-
notation associated with the term "propaganda," ' as well as the uncer-
tainty surrounding an importing country's decision to accept or deny a
film labelled as such. If foreign countries are less inclined to accept films
marked as propaganda, filmmakers may be unable to pay the import du-
ties levied on their films. Faced with the possibility of being financially
unable to show their films overseas, filmmakers might be deterred from
producing the films altogether.
136
Furthermore, the power to label films as "propaganda" exceeds the
powers delegated to the Agency by Congress. Once a film has been certi-
fied as having cultural, educational or scientific value, the Agency should
have no further influence on its distribution, and the presence of the label
on a film already certified as educational could affect the decision of the
importing country to grant the certified film the benefits entitled it under
the Agreement. Unfortunately, the elimination of the propaganda label
and the suggested other changes to the certification criteria may only
130. Egelko, Ninth Circuit Hears Arguments in 'Propaganda' Film Dispute, L.A. Daily




134. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
135. Webster's Dictionary states that the term is "now often used disparagingly to connote
deception or distortion." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1138 (2d ed. 1982). See also
note 10 for the Agency's definition of propaganda.
136. See supra notes 8, 20 and accompanying text.
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provide a partial solution to the effective administration of the Beirut
Agreement.
An additional hindrance may stem from the USIA itself. The
USIA's stated purpose, among others, is to "strengthen foreign under-
standing and support for United States policies and actions."' 37 It has
been questioned whether the Agency should "simply present a full and
fair image of the [United States], warts and all, or [whether it] should...
emphasize the good and play down or ignore the bad."' 38 Since films
deemed to be educational under the Treaty could also present a negative
view of the United States, the Agency's own declared purpose might con-
flict with the certification of such films. For this reason, the administra-
tion of the Treaty by an agency without this "purpose" might better
insure that films which qualify under the Beirut Agreement, despite be-
ing controversial or negative, receive certification. Congress should thus
reconsider its delegation of responsiblity to the USIA to implement the
Beirut Agreement.
Conclusion
The Beirut Agreement exists to facilitate the international exchange
of cultural materials and to increase goodwill among the member na-
tions. These objectives can best be fulfilled by regulations which en-
courage the making and distribution of documentary films. The Bullfrog
case highlights the need to enact constitutionally acceptable certification
criteria that will allow documentary filmmakers to distribute their films
abroad. This Note has proposed that certification criteria, though con-
tent-based, can be formulated within the bounds of the first amendment.
Through the elimination of the propaganda label and modifications to
the tests for determining what is "cultural, educational or scientific," the
United States may ensure freedom of expression for documentary film-
makers. Such freedom would ultimately augment international goodwill,
and as foreign audiences would benefit from American creativity and ar-
tistic impression, the United States would thus fulfill the true spirit of the
Beirut Agreement.
137. USIA, Fact Sheet (Oct. 1989), at 1.
138. Holt, Bad Precedents at USIA, Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 4, 1985, at 15, col. 2.
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